We describe a system to support decision-making on the ethical acceptability of animal experiments for scientific researchers and others responsible for ethical decision-making in animal experiments. The system consists of eight steps. Each step c.ontains a number ·of substantive questions or a computational rule, leading to a well-articulated moral judgment on specific animal experiments. The system comprises a number of moral assumptions and pre-emptive norms, but leaves enough room for moral discretion and personal responsibility. The general ethical ideas behind the moral choices and assumptions are sketched and potential objections to the overall approach are discussed.
The problem of which animal experiments are ethically acceptable, has been debated (Ryder 1975 , Singer 1975 , Smith & Boyd 1991 , Orlans 1993 , De Deyn 1994 , Van Zutphen & Balls 1997 , and many others). There is little dispute that an animal experiment is only acceptable when it cannot be replaced by a replacement (e.g. in vitro) alternative. Furthermore, the number of animals used in an experiment should be reduced to a minimum and the researchers must do their best to refine the experiment so that the animals suffer as little as possible (Russell & Burch 1959) . Far more problematic is the question of whether the benefits of the experiment outweigh the suffering of the animals. Stafleu (1994) suggested that, in practice, weighing of suffering against benefit is only done superficially and virtually all attention is given to Correspondence to: Dr F. R. Stafleu, Center for Bio·Ethics and Health Law, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 2, 3584 CS Utrecht. The Netherlands. Tel: (31) 302534399. Fax: (31) 302539410, E·mail: f.r.stafleu@j!Obox.accu.uu.nl considering the other factors mentioned above (re the 'three Rs'). One explanation for this might be that the researchers involved have little idea how to set about the task of balancing the signifi-cance of their research against the interests of the animals. In this article we present a systematic approach that addresses this problem. We describe a system that is meant to support the process of assessing and weighing the various considerations that determine the ethical acceptability of an animal experiment. It is not a rigidly defined system but allows for discretion by its users. The aim is to help people whose task it is to decide about experiments, for example researchers, members of animal experiments review committees, to do so in a systematic way.
Several existing frameworks have already been proposed to aid in balancing the interests of humans and animals, regarding scientific experiments (Smith & Boyd 1991 , Porter 1992 , De Cock Buning & Theune 1993 , Mellor & Reid 1994 . A number of elements that appear in these proposals are identical to those we also consider morally relevant, although there are significant differences. We want to point out two important aspects in which we believe our system to be different.
First, the existing frameworks mentioned do not extensively articulate and evaluate the human interests involved in animal experiments. Often the questions posed amount to no more than an invitation to give a general, fairly intuitive statement on the significance of the research. Assessing human interests is a difficult task involving tough moral choices. None of the earlier authors appeared to have made these choices, but we did. Secondly, we used a specific moral theory and methodology which is referred to in the discussion. In the literature on animal ethics, philosophers have offered a variety of theories and principles for judging the ethical acceptability of animal experiments. We think that these theories do not live up to the complexity and intricacy of ethical decisionmaking in a practical context. Rather they ignore or reduce this complexity by imposing too broad and simple principles (Singer 1990, 19951, pre-emptive norms (Taylor 1986) or fundamental rights of animals (Regan 1983) on the balancing process. We claim that our methods and theories are more appropriate in these respects.
The purpose of the decision-making system
Our framework has three functions as follows: First, it provides a checklist of all the morally relevant factors that should be considered. Second, the system helps to find the fundamental considerations on which a specific judgment hinges and shows the implications of alternative decisions. Third, it introduces specific moral choices and assumptions. Of course, this does not mean that the user is discharged of moral responsibility since he or she has to endorse the moral choices incorporated in the system.
We started to develop the system with a number of widely endorsed judgments. For instance, the moral weight given to nonhuman primates above other animals, and Laboratory Animals (1999) 
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generally acknowledged scientific methodological standards (regarding experimental design and so forth). In the process of building up the framework we tried to capture all morally relevant factors which playa role in judging the legitimacy of an experiment on animals.
Next we introduced figures and scales for a number of parameters so that the user had to be explicit about the weight they had assigned to the significance of the various factors. This was not done to suggest that value-judgments in themselves could be objective, or lend themselves to mathematical computation, but to try to make the subjective assessment of the user more objective and make this more amenable to discussion.
The key point of our system is the introduction of the weighing factors and on the feedback it gives to the user concerning their initial intuitions. By going through the process of scoring the separate questions one might end up with a result that differs from one's initial judgment. This might be a reason to reconsider the ethical evaluation. Figure 1 gives an overall picture of the system. The system has eight steps.
Description of the system
Step 1: Description of the ultimate aim of the experiment The central issue, on which the moral weight of the experiment depends, is the ultimate aim of the experiment. This aim can be described as an assignable and desirable state of affairs that can be pointed out by the researchers for others) and that is the motivation to do the research. For instance in the case of safety testing of products such as food additives, it is not the knowledge about the safety of the substance that is the ultimate aim, but the marketing of the product. This is the ultimate motivation for doing the research and performing the experiment. One of the problems at this stage is that the description of the ultimate aims might be extremely abstract or vague. For the colouring matters of food, the aim could be
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Step six: assessment and scoring of the harm to the interest of animals described as 'enhancing the aesthetic pleasure of food consumption' and this might be said to contribute to 'the welfare of human beings'. It is clear that this last statement is too vague. Therefore, we stress that the endin-view must be described in a relatively concrete way, and that it must represent in a realistic manner the aim that motivates the research project. It is not sufficient to point out the ultimate aim in itself. The proposed route to achieving this end, the stage at which the proposed experiment takes place and what is hoped of it, must also be described. The system aims at evaluating the moral acceptability of the experiment in a 'holistic' way, by assessing its significance in a larger whole. The ultimate aim sets the initial value and significance; critical evaluation of the position of the individual experiment in this larger whole may diminish this value. For example the ultimate aim of an experiment might be to produce a drug against cancer, but when the experiment is, for example, badly designed it is without value.
Step 2: Determination of the weight of the human interests involved in realizing the purpose of research
We distinguished three kinds of human interest which may justify animal experiments: health interests, knowledge interests and economic interests. The system asks the user to determine to what extent the aim contributes to these interests. It also sets moral standards by assigning weighing factors to each of these interests.
Health interest
We think that human health ought to count more than knowledge and economic interests. Therefore we assigned a maximum of 10 points to the human health interest and a maximum of 5 points to knowledge and economics. The decision to assign the highest weight to human health is, we think, relatively un controversial. We argue for this decision on the basis of a principle of respect for persons whose health and survival are normally necessary for the full and autonomous development of persons (Daniels 1985) .
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However, it would take us too long to argue the theory behind this principle in detail here. The theory would explain why, in the process of determining the moral significance of a particular aim, parameters like the degree of human suffering involved (in terms of duration and severity of pain and/or handicaps), mortality and morbidity should also be taken into consideration. The system offers these factors as items to be scored. Of particular significance is the requirement to compare the present situation of health and availability of therapy or state of knowledge etc., with the situation after the aim of the experiment has been accomplished successfully. For example the purpose of the experiment might be to develop a drug against a serious disease. But if there is already a range of therapeutic means available to fight the disease, then it is the improvement this particular drug makes relative to the existing range, that ought to count. Small improvements should be scored low, e.g. the first drug against a serious cancer scores 9 or 10, while a drug that only differs £rom this first drug in a better uptake might score a 5. On the other hand, in cases where there is no successful therapy, even though the contribution of the research may be rather small, an overall great improvement might be reached by a series of these small, but necessary steps. In this situation the score should be adjusted accordingly. For example, research into the role of a certain peptide in replication of some virus is in itself a small step [so the initial score can be 3) but could in the long run prove to be essential for a drug (so the final score can be 8-10 depending on the virus and the disease it causes etc.). One should however be critical about these claims, for they are often made but rarely grounded.
Knowledge interests
Knowledge is often valuable for its instrumental importance, relative to the other two interests. It may lead to an improvement in human or animal health, or contribute to a sound economy. But knowledge is also valuable in itself. The knowledge score is meant for fundamental knowledge that has no direct application to health or welfare. This means that all other cases, for instance research on cell-receptors or on genes, which may have future medical application and is motivated by this possibility, should be scored under health interest. The assessment of the scientific significance of a project, in which animals are used is a complex matter. Parameters that may help with scoring are the quality of the hypothesis relative to theoretical background, supportive evidence and potential growth of knowledge, and the originality of the approach.
.The maximum score for knowledge is 5 points. We are of the opinion that there is no justification for exposing animals to serious harm, risk or pain just to find out more about them, or about nature, i.e. with no prospect of putting the knowledge to the benefit of human beings or animals. We do not deny that knowledge can have intrinsic value, or lead to authentic feelings of pleasure and joy for human beings, but ethics is about making choices between values, and we think that values concerning animals are overriding here.
Economic interest
Economic interest is not explicitly mentioned in the law as justification to perform animal experiments. However, when we look at the ultimate aim of many of the experiments actually done, it is obvious that these interests often play an important, even overriding role, especially in the context of industry. To make our system more usable in practice, and particularly to make the moral significance of these kinds of interest more amenable to discussion and assessment, we explicitly included economic interests in our system. The maximum value of this interest was set at 5 points and three items should be taken as broad guidelines in determining a score: (al industry-related interests (corebusiness of the company or only marginally related to this business; consequences in terms of employment, profit and efficiency); (b) national economy (central importance for a nation's economy); (c) human welfare (relative enhancement in human welfare).
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Step 3: Computation of the total score for the ultimate aim This step is complicated because, in order to prevent double-counting, we had to develop four different formulas that apply to different combinations of scores for health, knowledge and welfare. The formulas are designed with the intention of preventing the possibility of a poor score for health interest being 'upgraded' to a higher score by adding poor scores from o~her interests. The user is therefore asked to choose at the outset one of the three interests as signifying the main interest of the purpose of the experiment (see Fig 1 for the formulasl.
Step 4: Assessment of the relevance of the animal experiment
In this step the connection between the experiment and the ultimate aim is evaluated (i.e. the research methodology and approach). An experiment may have a clear and important aim, but might be poorly designed or not strictly necessary to reach the aim. So a good aim does not imply a good experiment. The following six items are considered and each is scored to add up to a total score for the relevance of the animal experiment.
Replacement
If there is a replacement alternative, then performing the experiment is ethically unacceptable and against the (European) law. There may be discussion whether the alternatives are validated, but apart from specific problems in this respect, scoring is easy. If there is an alternative, the experiment scores a in the end resulting in an overall judgment of unacceptability. If there is no alternative, the score is 10.
General methodological quality
Under this heading factors such as reliability, validity and statistical aspects should be taken into account-i.e. the general rules of science that are of vital importance to the production of reliable data and well-founded conclusions. If the general methodology is unsatisfactory, the experiment is unacceptable and the score should be O. Even when the methodology is barely satisfactory the experiment is still unacceptable. Therefore only scores of 7 and above are considered acceptable in the system. The possible scores are either 0, or between 7 and 10.
Quality of the experiment from the perspective of laboratory animal science
Here we refer to concerns regarding methodology which apply in particular to experiments using laboratory animals. Relevant items are: choice of animals, the number of animals needed to produce significant results, microbiological and genetic quality of the animals, possible refinement of the experiment. As with methodology above, the scores can be a (unacceptable) or between 7 and 10.
Necessity of the performance of the experiment to achieve the ultimate aim
To assess the necessity, one has to evaluate the pathway from the individual experiment to the ultimate goal and answer questions such as: is it clear how this experiment fits in with the total pathway? Are the steps in the pathway clear and logical? Are the results of the specific experiment really necessary to reach the ultimate goal? If not, is the aim formulated properly? Is the knowledge already available in the literature? Might the problems, connected with the ultimate aim , not be solved in another way? For example some illnesses are more sensibly fought with preventive measures than with costly therapies developed using animals. This last question is notoriously difficult to answer, but it would do no harm for these fundamental questions to be tabled occasionally. The quality of this justification for the experiments can only be enhanced by taking them seriously.
If the question of whether or not the experiment is necessary is an all-or-nothing affair, then a score of either 0 or 10 is all that is possible. However, if necessity is conceived as on a gradient, variable scores from 1 to 10 are possible. Poor scores (0-5llead to the judgment that the experiment is morally unacceptable, and it should therefore ulti-Laboratory Animals (1999) 33 Stafleu et al.
mately be scored as O. Satisfactory to optimal scores lie between 6 and 10.
Probability of achieving the ultimate aim
The central question here is whether the probability of achieving the ultimate aim is low, average or high. It may be that the experiment is based on assumptions and hypotheses for which the evidence is rather weak. Of course, it is in the nature of scientific experiments that there is never a guarantee of success. Therefore, only low probabilities should lead to a negative judgment. The history of the project or the research group may give some clues as to the probability of achievement. If the project has a very long history without any significant results, the probability that the proposed experiment will yield any results may, barring exceptional circumstances, be scored low. Because of the general character of this item only 0, 5 or 10 should be scored.
Credit rating of the research group
Theune and De Cock Buning (1993) suggested the following questions as relevant to the judgment of an animal experiment: Is this type of animal experiment new for the group and is there enough experience in the group as a whole? How experienced are the researchers who conduct the actual research? Is the group involved in research into alternatives for animal experiments or have shown concern about this possibility? Is a pilot study necessary? Should there be a supervisory committee? Were earlier pilot studies followed by full studies (if not the capacity of the group to design good research may be too lowl?
Unsatisfactory answers to these questions should lead to the judgment that the experiment is unacceptable (overall score 0). If the answers concerning all the six items relating to the relevance is satisfactory or more, then the relevance may vary between 0.65 and 1.
Step 5: Calculation of the interest of the experiment for human beings
The combination of the score for the human interest relating to the ultimate aim, and the score for the relevance of the experiment, result in a score for interest of the experiment for human beings. The following formula is used:
IVA (interest of the ultimate aim)
x R (relevance) = HI (human interest)
Step 6: Assessment and scoring of the harm to the interests of animals
There are three elements that comprise the interests of the animals involved and the harm done to these interests: animal experience (i.e. suffering), psychological complexity and the intrinsic value of the individual animals being used. For the 'experience' element of the scoring system, we developed a formula based on the one used by the Animal Review Committee of the Dutch branch of Solvay Pharmaceuticals Inc. The formula considers three parameters: the predicted pain and discomfort (suffering) involved in the experiment and procedures leading up to it (for instance isolation of the animals), the predicted duration of the suffering, and the number of animals subjected to the suffering. The predicted pain and discomfort is scored with the help of the following list in which a general description is followed by examples to make the description more amenable. This list is a general guideline andit becomes more and more objective and better described as a result of discussions between assessors.
Zero points:
No discomfort, or lin some rare cases) enhancement of well-being. Example: behaviour studies in an enriched environment.
One point: Light discomfort; a small intervention, involving fear of short duration (minutes), isolation of social animals combined with normal care. Examples: injection of substances with little adverse effect, blood samplings, terminal anaesthesias.
Two points: Medium discomfort, such as a medium-level of pain, stress which provokes an adverse reaction, isolation of social animals in experimental housing. Examples: small surgical interventions under anaesthe-301 sia, heart puncture, fasting 124hI, administration of substances with medium adverse effects, light stress stimuli, housing in metabolic cages.
Three points: Serious discomfort, such as acute substantial pain or chronic stress, extreme climatic conditions, administration of substances with serious effects, extreme stress stimuli, starvation for more than 24 hi severe infections, extensive surgical interventions.
Four points: Very severe or extreme discomfort. Examples: second degree skin burns, induction of diseases which causes severe disturbance of homeostasis resulting in death, continuous immobilizations, agonal phase leading to death.
The duration of suffering is scored on the basis of the following classification guideline. Zero points for a one-time event or a short period. One point for medium length of time lone to few hours) or for frequent actions (like repeated blood sampling). Two points for long-lasting periods (more than 3 h) or very frequent actions.
The number of animals involved is also counted on a three-point classification: a point for less than 10 animals, 1 point for 10 to 100 animals, 2 points for numbers above 100.
The score for suffering is computed by the following formula:
Actual discomfort +[(number of animals +duration of experiment)/2] The highest possible score is 6.
Next we have the intrinsic value element. This concept is also found in literature as 'inherent worth' (Taylor 1986) or 'inherent value' (Regan 1983) . The concept of the intrinsic value of an individual animal is intended as a reminder that we have to respect animals for their own sake, because they have a 'good of their own', and are not purely instrumental to the interests of human beings. We introduce this idea as a relevant factor to express our conviction that instrumental use of animals, as in experiments, is in itself morally problematic and has to be justified. For these reasons a fixed score of 2 points is added to the animal harm score.
As for psychological complexity, the philosopher Van De Veer (1979) argued that this property of animals (and human beings) is relevant and should correct the decisions we make on the basis of the discomfort score. This factor ought to playa role when we balance the interests of various animal species against one another. Psychologically complex animals like dolphins and higher primates ought to get more moral consideration than less complex animals like rodents or cold-blooded ones. In earlier research IStafleu 1994, Tramper 1998) we found that people have a preconception of psychological complexity that guides their choice of animal species. However, within the rather coarse structure of our system we could think of no good reason for the differentiation between species other than that between three categories: higher primates (who get a bonus of 2 points), other warmblooded vertebrates (who come down to 0) and cold-blooded vertebrates (who have the bad luck of getting a 2-point reduction). But these are only suggestions and we are far from sure and still weighing up the pros and cons.
Step 7: Computation of the harm-score for animals
The harm done to the animals' interests is computed with the help of the following formula:
Animal suffering score +2 (= fixed intrinsic value score) +psychological complexity score = AI (animal interest score).
A maximum of 10 for higher primates, 8 for other wann-blooded vertebrates and 6 points for cold-blooded vertebrates.
Step 8: Assessment of the ethical acceptability of the experiment If the end-score for the human interest involved with the experiment (see step 3) is equal or higher than the end-score for the harm done to the animals' interests (step n Laboratory Animals (1999) 33 Stafleu et al. then the experiment should be deemed acceptable. If this human-interest score is lower, the experiment is probably unacceptable.
Discussion
During the development of the system and when we presented our ideas, the philosophical and practical problems were huge. We can only touch on a few of these. For example, there was much misunderstanding, skepticism and protest as to our 'measuring' or 'mathematical' approach. People do not seem to like the combination of ethics and scores. One critic accused us of 'physics envy', another of a misplaced attempt at objectivity. However, our only aim was to demonstrate where the differences in judgment between individuals or committees might be, and which areas of concern determine the end result.
We want to dismiss the suggestion that the system is a purely utilitarian one. Of course, it is a weighing system and assumes that it is possible to compare and assess various considerations in a way that leads to a justified judgment on moral acceptability. But these considerations are not reducible to one value that acts as a common denominator, for instance happiness. We have already made it clear that our fundamental ethical position is based on a principle of respect for persons, the elements of which can be traced back to Aristotle, Kant, John Rawls (1972) and Amartya Sen (1985) . Moreover, we ascribe intrinsic value to individual animals.
The psychological complexity of animals is a complex concept. It is not the same as 'attractive to humans'. For example, it is a fact that people are more attracted to furry animals with big human-like eyes, but this is not what we value. Our approach is rooted in the idea that 'psychological complexity' is a complex but morally relevant factor which justifies differential treatment. Our notion of psychological complexity is anthropocentric in the way that it values typical human features like self-consciousness. But it is not dogmatic speciesism, because other entities that have comparable complexity are valued accordingly. That is the reason why non-human higher primates are more protected than other mammals. Psychological complexity is the key to our system, as it does not only justify different treatment of certain species, it also acts as a measure of human interest. Human interests that justify animal experiments are those interests that are needed for, or contribute to, essential elements of human psychological complexity (e.g. as expressed in being 'a person').
It is clear that on many points the system is, as yet, imperfect and incomplete, and this is inevitable. We can claim only that it is a first attempt, a first step on a road that is long and winding and which is characterized by a lot of obstacles. Moreover, the system has been developed largely with the paradigm of medical research in mind. There are other sorts of animal experiments, for instance those performed for educational purposes and for the development of veterinary science and its applications. We certainly do not think that we have spoken the last word on the issue, but we hope to have offered an interesting framework for discussion of the problem of balancing human and animal interests.
